Wilfrid Laurier University

Scholars Commons @ Laurier
Psychology Faculty Publications

Psychology

2011

Children’s ability to recall unique aspects of one occurrence of a
repeated event
Sonja P. Brubacher
Central Michigan University

Una Glisic
Wilfrid Laurier University

Kim P. Roberts
Wilfrid Laurier University, kroberts@wlu.ca

Martine B. Powell
Deakin University, martine.powell@deakin.edu.au

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/psyc_faculty
Part of the Psychiatry and Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Brubacher, S., Glisic, U., Roberts, K.P., & Powell, M.B. (2011). Children’s ability to recall unique aspects of
one occurrence of a repeated event. Applied Cognitive Psychology, 25, 351-358. DOI: 10.1002/acp.1696

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Psychology at Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Psychology Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholars
Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact scholarscommons@wlu.ca.

Recalling unique aspects 1
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Abstract
Preschool and school-age children’s memory and source monitoring were investigated by
questioning them about one occurrence of a repeated lab event (n = 39). Each of the four
occurrences had the same structure, but with varying alternatives for the specific activities and
items presented. Variable details had a different alternative each time; hi/lo details presented the
identical alternative three times and changed once. New details were present in one occurrence
only and thus had no alternatives. Children more often confused variable, lo, and new details
across occurrences than hi details. The 4- to 5-year-oldchildren were less accurate than 7- to 8year-old children at attributing details to the correct occurrence when specifically asked.
Younger children rarely recalled new details spontaneously, whereas 50% of the older children
did and were above chance at attributing them to their correct occurrence. Results are discussed
with reference to script theory, fuzzy-trace theory and the source-monitoring framework.

Research Article
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In many cases of child sexual abuse, the victims’ memories and accounts of the alleged
abuse are of primary importance in order for prosecution to proceed properly. In recent years
there has been increasing focus on understanding children’s memory representations of repeated
events (e.g., Powell, Roberts, Thomson & Ceci, 2007; Price, Connolly & Gordon, 2006; Roberts
& Powell, 2006). As many victims of child abuse often experience the abuse on multiple
occasions (e.g., see Lamb, Sternberg, Esplin, Hershkowitz, Orbach & Hovav, 1997), it is
especially relevant to characterize how these experiences are represented from both a practical
and theoretical standpoint (see Roberts, 2002; Roberts & Powell, 2001, for reviews).
Many jurisdictions require that child witnesses are able to particularize; that is, to
describe one instance with a reasonable degree of precision and to contextualize that instance
with respect to time and place (Guadagno, Powell & Wright, 2006; R. v B. (G.), 1990; Roberts,
2002; S v. R, 1989). Identifying and distinguishing a specific occurrence of a repeated event is an
extremely daunting and difficult task for most children (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson,
1990; Powell, Roberts, Ceci & Hembrooke, 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996).
The purpose of this study was to examine whether pre-school and school-age children
can notice and make use of distinctive information contained within a set of similar, repeated
events to distinguish among them, and whether these abilities vary developmentally. This is the
first study to examine children’s memories of details (actions or objects) that are present in only
one of four event occurrences and are thus not part of the general event script (‘new’ details1: for
example, on the third day only, children do a warm-up activity). This type of event detail is
different from typical/atypical or episodic deviations present in previous research (e.g., Farrar &
Boyer-Pennington, 1999; Farrar & Goodman, 1992). While prior experiments have included
new/deviation details in a final target occurrence that were not previously presented in earlier
‘standard’ visits, in the current research new details were present in any one of the repeated
occurrences, not just at a final deviation visit. Other research has included some degree of
variation in every occurrence (e.g., Kuebli & Fivush, 1994; Powell & Thomson, 1996; Powell et
al., 1999) but in these studies, every instance of variation still includes a ‘slot’ in the script. For
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example, Kuebli and Fivush (1994) had children make the same crafts on four occasions; the
same nine steps were executed every time, but sometimes the specific item (e.g., the object used
to create the bird’s beak) or the specific action (e.g., how the pipecleaner tail was fastened) was
changed. In contrast, the new details in the current research do not have ‘slots’ within the event
script, but they are still plausible within the context of the event, such as getting warmed up only
in occurrence three. These new details allow us to determine how children characterize
completely unique event features within the context of a series of similar events. Children may
recognize the new detail as a distinguishing feature of the occurrence, and as such they may be
better able to separate memories for these occurrences from other similar occurrences, resulting
in more informed source decisions at retrieval (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).
Further, this is the first study to examine children’s repeated-event memory using an
optimal interview procedure where the child is given the freedom to report the occurrence they
remember best, unlike previous research where children are oriented to a pre-determined
occurrence, typically the last one (e.g., Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Farrar & Goodman, 1992;
Powell et al., 1999). This procedure avoids constraining a child to discuss the occurrence that the
experimenters have chosen, and allows for clear and unabridged insight into what details were
especially salient to the child. Such a procedure is especially beneficial for the current
experiment because we are exploring a detail-type that has not previously been considered in
repeated-event research and thus do not want to place restrictions on what is reported.
Children’s Memories of Repeated Experiences
Memory for fixed items across multiple experiences (i.e., details that are exactly the same
during each occurrence) is strong and accurate in children and adults, as compared to recall of a
single experience (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 1990). Even very young children (i.e., 45 years) can be as accurate as older children (7-8 years; Powell et al., 1999). In contrast, when
examining variable items (i.e., details that are repeated each time, such as always playing a
counting game, but with different instantiations, such as counting frogs in Occurrence 1,
counting cars in Occurrence 2, etc.), recall of a specific occurrence tends to be filled with
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intrusions of instantiations from the other occurrences. These are referred to as ‘internal intrusion
errors’, and are the most common type of errors found in children’s recall of repeated events
(Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996). For example, Powell and colleagues found that
3-5 (Powell et al., 1999) and 4-5 year olds (Powell & Thomson, 1996) made a similar number of
internal intrusions as older children (6- to 8-years old) when asked specific questions about
items.
In one of the earliest experiments on repeated-event memory, a distinctive memory
pattern was found for a third type of item (Powell & Thomson, 1996). Specifically, hi/lo items
had two different instantiations; one was presented twice as often as the other across the series
(e.g., a highlighter pen was used in four occurrences [high frequency]; a pencil in the other two
[low frequency]). All of the errors made by the children who participated in the repeated event
were internal intrusion errors, primarily because children recalled the hi instantiations more
readily than the lo instantiations, and so were less likely to attribute the lo instantiations to the
correct occurrence. Older children (6- to 8- year olds) made more of these errors in free recall
than did younger children (4- to 5- year olds) because they reported far more lo instantiations.
Thus, while the older children still confused details across occurrences, they were more likely to
spontaneously report deviations than were the younger children.
In summary, details that are presented in the same way each time are well-remembered
and accessible (i.e., fixed items, and the hi frequency instantiation of hi/lo items). Details that
have several alternatives across sessions are easily confused (variable items), and variations (i.e.,
the lo frequency instantiation of hi/lo items) are rarely reported when a higher frequency item is
available.
Children’s Memories for Distinctive Information
Although low frequency details (variable and lo) are less accurately reported than fixed
and hi details, these findings do not address the question of whether truly unique items (i.e.,
those that occur only once in any format across the entire series of events) are distinctive, and
encoded as such. Objects or actions that occur in just one occurrence may be more memorable
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than other detail-types that always occur in some format (even if the exact instantiations differ).
Conversely, they may be less often reported, especially by younger children (4- to 5- year olds),
because they are arbitrary to the event sequence; that is, since each new item only occurs one
time across the four event occurrences, they cannot be logically related to other items within
each event. Research has demonstrated that 3- and 5-year old children report less information
from arbitrarily connected versus logically connected events, even with repeated experience
(Fivush, Kuebli & Clubb, 1992).
While new details have not been previously examined, three theoretical models motivated
our predictions concerning children’s reporting of this detail-type: script theories (e.g., Farrar &
Goodman, 1992; Hudson, Fivush & Kuebli, 1992; Hudson & Nelson, 1986), Fuzzy-Trace theory
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1990) and the Source-Monitoring Framework (e.g., Johnson et al.,
1993). Script theories suggest that after a certain amount of experience with an event, people
form a general representation of what details are usually present, and also are able to note
deviations that are not typical of the event script. One such theory, the Schema ConfirmationDeployment Model (Farrar & Goodman, 1992) suggests that this process requires more
experiences for 4-year old than 7-year old children and adults because younger children take
longer to confirm which objects and actions are relevant for the script. Thus, high frequency
details (hi) can be confirmed quickly because they are always presented in the same way, while
low frequency (variable and lo) details pose more of a challenge for preschool children because
these details are absorbed into the general script representation, or are not encoded, during the
confirmation phase. Even though children as young as 30-months old have been able to
generalize actions by a third experience (Bauer & Fivush, 1992), older children and adults
progress through this ‘script confirmation’ phase more quickly and are thus able to enter into
‘deployment’ sooner (i.e., notice event deviations, such as variable or lo, or completely new
details, and modify the original script). According to the ‘script pointer + tag hypothesis’, new
details do not match existing patterns within the confirmed script and may be useful as ‘tags’
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(e.g., “the time she gave us leaf badges to wear”), which are tied directly to the memory trace
and thus, easier to recall (Graesser, Gordon & Sawyer, 1979).
Fuzzy-trace theory posits that for any experience, verbatim and gist traces are encoded
simultaneously and in parallel. Verbatim traces refer to the exact surface details of an event (e.g.,
“I wore a leaf badge and the leader wore a blue cloak”), and include source information (e.g.,
“on the last day”). Gist traces refer to the overall meaning or structure of the experience (e.g.,
“we listen to stories and the leader wears a cloak”). Pre-schoolers take longer than school-aged
children to form a gist representation and their verbatim traces decay more rapidly (Brainerd &
Reyna, 1990, 1998, 2004). This combination of weakened verbatim traces and a weak gist to
assist in event reconstruction make it especially difficult for young children to accurately
describe a single occurrence of a repeated event. Event repetition strengthens the verbatim traces
for details that are always or often the same (e.g., fixed, hi), and in contrast, strengthens the gist
traces of items that have varying alternatives (e.g., “there was always a badge”) but not the
alternatives of those items (e.g., “it was a jellybean badge”; Roberts & Powell, 2006). Since new
items have no alternatives, both verbatim and gist traces will be weak, so these details should be
infrequently reported. Older children’s verbatim traces decay more slowly than do younger
children’s, however, so older children should have a better memory for new details.
The Source-Monitoring Framework asserts that source is attributed at retrieval through a
decision-making process about the qualitative properties of memories (e.g., “I remember the blue
cloak the best, so it was probably on the last day”). Children are capable of remembering the
content details of repeated events; for example, that a story was read each time, and the stories
were about a boat, a birthday party, a mouse and a dog, but the problem lies in their ability to
accurately tag the specific detail to the correct occurrence in a series of events (Powell &
Thomson, 1996; Powell et al., 1999). These errors may also be referred to as ‘source-monitoring
errors,’ or ‘source confusions’ which are akin to internal intrusions.
The repeated-event nature of the current paradigm promotes developmental differences in
source-monitoring ability because the occurrences are highly similar, and younger children (4- to
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5- years old) are especially vulnerable to the effects of similarity (Johnson et al, 1993; Lindsay et
al, 1991; Roberts & Blades, 1999). Details presented at higher frequencies (e.g., hi) will be more
frequently recalled and, as they are present in more than one occurrence, source decisions are
less necessary. Thus, age differences would not be expected for hi details. In contrast, infrequent
details such as lo and variable instantiations would require source decisions and so it is expected
that 7- to 8- year old children will outperform 4- to 5- year old children at attributing these detailtypes to the correct occurrence. Age differences can also be expected with respect to new
instantiations. The source-monitoring framework posits that distinctive information may be
encoded differently than mundane information. Specifically, more cognitive operations such as
organization and elaboration should take place when distinctive information is encountered
(Johnson et al., 1993). These elaborations promote the binding of event features, such as
activities and objects, so that more informed source decisions can be made concerning which
details were present in a given occurrence (see Shimamura, 1995 for a review). Thus, at least for
older children, correct source attribution for this detail-type should be better than for variable
and lo, because they are not a variation of a previously presented item, as are the other types.
In summary, all three theories suggest that hi instantiations will be retrieved the most
often, and will be the most accurately attributed of all detail types; these effects will not vary
developmentally. Similarly, all predict that variable instantiations will be reported, but confused
across occurrences, that lo instantiations will be rarely reported, and that there will be age
differences favouring older children in accurate source attribution of variable and lo
instantiations. Regarding new details, script theory and the source-monitoring framework predict
that these details will stand out and be bound with its occurrence whereas new details are likely
to be simply forgotten according to fuzzy-trace theory. All three theories predict that younger
children will be significantly less likely to report new details than older children.
Method
Design & Participants
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The mixed design was a 2(age: 4-5- years vs. 7-8- years) x 4(item frequency type: hi, lo,
variable, new) with the last factor within-subjects. Originally, 57 children were recruited to take
part in the present study. Eighteen children were excluded; 6 missed either an event or interview
session, 9 were lost due to parental constraints and/or cancellations, and data from 3 children
were discarded because the interviewer did not ask open-ended questions in recall. These age
groups were chosen to ease comparisons with previous literature and to show developmental
differences across a period of significant growth in source-monitoring skills (Roberts, 2002).
The final sample consisted of 39 children (21 males, 18 females); 18 4- to 5-year-old
children with a mean age of 62.15 months (SD = 6.62, range 49.87–71.50 months), and 21 7- to
8-year-old children with a mean age of 95.58 months (SD = 7.04, range 84.67–107.40 months).
The sample was predominantly middle-income and Caucasian. Children were recruited through a
local daycare and through a database of local parents who had expressed interest in
developmental research. Parents and teachers were instructed not to discuss the activities with
the children, or to inform them that they would be interviewed about their memories. Children
were assigned randomly to two counterbalanced item sets, under the constraint that age and
gender be equated across the sets. Parents of children recruited through the database were
compensated $10 for their time and travel expenses, and the children received a small toy after
each session. The daycare received a donation of $5 for each child that participated.
Materials
Materials were based on previous research on children’s memories for repeated events
(Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996; Powell & Thomson, 2003). As with the previous
research, in order to control for item effects, two sets of counterbalanced items (Group 1 and
Group 2) were created for the study. That is, variable items in Group 1 were reassigned to serve
as hi/lo and new in Group 2, and so on. The two groups did not differ significantly in the amount
of information reported, or on any accuracy measures, ts < 1, ps = ns, and are collapsed in all
analyses.
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Each occurrence consisted of 14 target items with different frequencies: variable (6
items, e.g., the content of the story differed every time), hi/lo (6 items, e.g., children received
hand sanitizer to get refreshed in three of the four occurrences and a fan in the remaining
occurrence; each occurrence thus contained 1-2 lo instantiations). Each of the new details (8 in
total) only appeared once throughout the series, and each occurrence included two distinct new
objects or actions. For example, in Occurrence 1 of Group 2 (refer to Appendix A), children
were introduced to ‘Pop the Fox’ (first new detail of the occurrence) and also a ‘noisy walrus’
(second new detail). Neither the fox nor the walrus were ever present in any of the other
occurrences.
Procedure
The event. The event, always referred to in plural as the ‘[name of university]
Activities,’ was carried out four times over a two week period by a trained research assistant
(RA) with groups of one to five children. The events took roughly 20 min and were scheduled at
approximately the same time of day with two occurrences per week. Two RAs were responsible
for conducting the events, and each ran approximately half of the children. The event included a
number of different activities. In every occurrence, the leader would tell the children that they
were participating in the ‘[name of university] Activities’, and put up a poster of the relevant
upper-case letter for the university. After this beginning phase, the remaining activities took
place. Activities that occurred every time include: the leader putting on a cloak, then reading a
story using a bookmark and completing a puzzle with the children. Then the children got
refreshed, made a picture with magnets, and played a counting game. For a full list of activities
and objects in each occurrence, see Appendix A. Note that the list is organised by detail-type; the
numbers represent the temporal order of the activities.
The interview. Five to seven days after the last occurrence of the Activities, children
individually participated in an interview, which lasted 20 to 30 min, and occurred in a different
room than the Activities, with a different RA. The children were first asked to talk about
themselves, in order to build rapport with the interviewer. The interviewer then explained she
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was naive about the event (e.g., “I wasn’t there when you did the ‘[name of university]
Activities’, but I’d really like to know what happened”). Once the child mentioned any
information about the Activities (all did), they were immediately asked whether the activities
happened one time or more than one time. Subsequently, the children were asked to talk about
“the time they remembered best”, and the interviewers used open ended prompts such as “tell me
more”, “what else happened,” and “what happened next/after that.” Details freely recalled by
children about this target occurrence were tallied and used in analyses.
In past research interviewers have asked about a specific target occurrence, using
temporal labels, such as ‘the last time’ (Farrar & Goodman, 1992), or contextual labels such as
‘the time you wore the badge’ (Powell & Thomson, 2003). This procedure restricts the child to
describing the occurrence that the interviewer has chosen, which may not be the one that the
child is most capable of talking about. In the present study, then, labels for the occurrence being
discussed were chosen by either the child or the interviewer. If the child used a clear and
distinctive label that was unique to the occurrence (e.g., “I remember the last time” or “I
remember the time with the yellow cloak”), then this label was used in the remainder of the
questioning. If the child did not identify a clear label, the interviewers were instructed to use
something the child said (which was unique to an occurrence) or temporal labels such as ‘the
first time’.
In order to help with labelling the occurrence, the interviewers in this study were not
completely blind; they knew which instantiations were distinctive to every occurrence, and were
aware which labels were appropriate in order to make the coding for accuracy possible. If the
child did not come up with a discriminatory label on their own, the interviewers were instructed
to use a distinctive instantiation mentioned by the child as the label. For instance, in Group 2,
Occurrence 1 (refer to Appendix A), some distinctive instantiations were: the walrus (new), the
yellow cloak (variable), or the fans for getting refreshed (lo) as they only happened in the first
occurrence.
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When the child’s free narrative was exhausted, 20 specific questions were asked, one for
each target item presented in Appendix A (e.g., what did you sit on the time [child’s label]; what
was the story about the time [child’s label]). The questions pertained to the child-nominated
occurrence, were asked in random order, and the child was not asked about an item if that item
was used as their label. For instance, for a child who was asked to recall ‘the time you sat on
garbage bags’, the question ‘What did you sit on?’ was omitted.
Coding
Interviews were audio-taped, videotaped and transcribed verbatim for coding purposes.
Each of the items (e.g., “she read us a story”) as well as the instantiations of those items (e.g.,
boat story, or party story) that the child mentioned in Free Recall of their nominated occurrence
was noted, along with the frequency type (hi, lo, variable, or new), as well as which
occurrence(s) the instantiations occurred in (1, 2, 3, or 4). There were three categories for coding
responses: (i) an instantiation was coded as an accurate attribution if it was present in the target
occurrence; (ii) an instantiation was coded as an internal intrusion error if it had been present in
one of the three non-target occurrences; (iii) any reference to an item/activity/object that was not
present in any of the occurrences was coded as an external intrusion error (these were extremely
rare, however, and are not considered further); (iv) Specific Questions only: in addition to the
above categories, ‘don’t know’ and ‘other’ (e.g., when the child provided an answer that was
semantically unrelated to the question) were created. Eight specific questions probed all eight
new items presented across the series regardless of which session children elected to talk about.
Thus, for six of those questions, the correct response would be that the instantiation did not occur
in the particular session.
Proportional accuracy scores were computed by dividing the total number of accurate
attributions of each detail type (hi/lo, etc.) by the total number of instantiations of that type
mentioned (recall) or asked about (specific questions). For example, a child who recalled four
variable instantiations, three of which actually happened in the target occurrence, would have a
proportion accuracy attribution score of .75 for variable instantiations in free recall. Proportional
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scores for internal intrusions, external intrusions, don’t know, and other responses were similarly
calculated.
Results
Recall Data
We first examined which occurrences children nominated to describe. The two age
groups differed in their pattern of choices. Younger children chose the last occurrence most often
(n = 9, 50%), followed by the first (n = 6, 33%), second (n = 2, 11%) and third (n = 1, 6%).
Older children, in contrast, were roughly equivalent in their choice to describe the first (n = 7,
33%), third (n = 7, 33%) and last occurrences (n = 6, 29%), and only one elected to describe the
second (n = 1, 5%).
The recall portion of the interview could not be analyzed using a mixed-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA), as the children rarely spontaneously mentioned all of the item
types in their recall. Table 1 presents the mean proportion of accurate attributions by detail-type
for the younger and older groups. The table includes the number of children who mentioned each
detail, as well as the results of one-sample t-tests assessing whether the children’s attributions
were different from chance. In summary, few younger children mentioned new details (n = 3) or
lo (n = 7) instantiations spontaneously, and none were accurately attributed. Ten younger
children mentioned variable instantiations, but their source score was no different to chance
(chance = 25% because variable instantiations were present in 1 of 4 occurrences). Source
attribution of hi instantiations was better; 14 mentioned them, and were above chance (chance =
75% because hi instantiations were present in three of four event sessions) in attributing them to
the correct source. Approximately half (n = 11) of the older children mentioned new items and
were accurate at attributing them correctly to their nominated occurrence almost three-quarters of
the time. Children in the older age group generally mentioned more instantiations than the
younger age group. Their accuracy at attributing instantiations to the correct occurrence was
above chance only for new and hi instantiations.
Specific Questions
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Each type of response (accurate source attribution, internal intrusion, don’t know) was
analysed using the proportional scores in 2(age: 4-5- years vs. 7-8- years) x 4 (item frequency
type: hi vs. lo vs. variable vs. new) mixed ANOVAs. Alpha was set at .05. Six follow-up pairedsamples t-tests (i.e., all possible comparisons of item frequency types) were conducted to
compare proportion accurate source attributions across item frequency. Alpha was corrected for
multiple comparisons (.05/6 tests) and was set at .008.
Accurate source attributions. As was predicted, the between-subjects effect of age was
significant, F(1, 37) = 30.96, ηp2 =.47, p < .001; older children were more accurate (M = .50, SD
= .12), than younger children (M = .29, SD = .12). There was a main effect of item frequency
type, F(3, 35) = 61.82, ηp2 =.63, p < .001. Children were more likely to attribute the correct hi
instantiation to its occurrence than new, variable and lo instantiations as was originally
predicted. The analysis also revealed that new instantiations were accurately attributed to the
target occurrence (or correctly rejected) more often than were lo instantiations. No other
significant within-subjects effects were found at a corrected alpha level of .008. The interaction
was not significant, F(3, 35) = .731, ηp2 < .02, p = ns. See Table 2 for means and t-tests.
Internal intrusions. Because of the opportunity to provide ‘don’t know’ and ‘other’
responses to specific questions, proportion inaccurate is not the exact opposite of proportion
accurate, and so internal intrusions (source confusions) were analysed. The test of sphericity was
significant, and a Greenhouse-Geisser correction was applied. The main effect of age on
proportions of internal intrusion errors was not significant, F(1, 37) < 1, ηp2 < .01, p = ns. An
effect of item frequency type was found, F(1.87, 35) = 28.30, ηp2 = .43, p < .001. Children made
more internal intrusion errors in recall of lo and variable instantiations than new and hi
instantiations. It was also found that children misattributed hi frequency instantiations less often
to the target occurrence than new details. The interaction between age and item frequency type
did not reach significance, F(1.87, 35) = .36, ηp2 < .01, p = ns. See Table 2 for means and t-tests.
‘Don’t know’ responses. Although we did not make predictions regarding ‘don’t know’
responses, 87% of children made at least one ‘don’t know’ response to the 20 specific questions.
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The effect of age was significant, F(1, 37) = 11.33, ηp2 = .23, p = .002. The younger children (M
= .25, SD = .16) were significantly more likely to respond ‘don’t know’ than were older children
(M = .08, SD = .16). The effect of item frequency type was also significant, F(3, 35) = 5.86, ηp2 =
.14, p = .001. Children were significantly more likely to give a ‘don’t know’ response to
questions about new and variable instantiations than hi instantiations. No other within-subjects
effects were found. The interaction between age and item frequency type was not significant,
F(3, 35) = .46, ηp2 < .02, p = ns. See Table 2 for means and t-tests.
Discussion
Past research has indicated that children often have difficulties isolating one episode of a
repeated event (Connolly & Lindsay, 2001; Hudson, 1990; Powell et al., 1999; Powell &
Thomson, 1996). Although there is a large amount of empirical data showing that repetition
affects memory, we do not yet fully understand how children represent events that vary slightly
each time, as is more typical of everyday events. We investigated whether details unique to an
instance of a repeated event, and thus not part of the general script, would be more accurately
attributed by children to their nominated target occurrence than other types of low-frequency
details. This research is intended to be the first step in understanding whether children who can
identify these unique features can be encouraged to use them to more precisely isolate individual
instances of repeated events.
As expected, both younger and older children were most accurate at attributing hi
instantiations to the correct occurrence, and there were no age differences. There were also no
age differences in specific questioning in the proportion of internal intrusions for any item type,
in keeping with findings suggesting that repeated experience minimizes age differences in
intrusion errors when asked specific questions (Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996).
The data concerning hi instantiations replicate studies finding that oft-repeated items are recalled
as accurately by younger children as older children (e.g., Powell et al., 1999). In contrast,
children were much less accurate when discussing lo instantiations, and there were clear age
differences in free recall. Descriptively, more 7- to 8-year-olds (81%) reported lo instantiations
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than did 4- to 5-year olds (39%). Not one lo instantiation provided by a younger child was
accurately attributed, while approximately half (48%) of the lo instantiations reported by the
older children were. Variable instantiations were reported by children of both age groups as
predicted, and they did not differ in their accuracy in free recall or in response to specific
questions. Thus, children’s recall of self-nominated occurrences was comparable to their recall of
an experiment-nominated occurrence for the item types that have been used in previous research.
Turning now to the new details that were only presented once across the series, there was
evidence that children were better able to attribute these details to the correct source than the
other low frequency types (i.e., lo and variable). Specifically, there was a greater proportion of
accurate attributions to questions about new details than lo items; accurate recall of new items
was above chance for older children, and there were fewer internal intrusions about new than lo
and variable items. Several contemporary theories that can be applied to memories of repeated
events (script, the source-monitoring framework, fuzzy trace) predict that unique (or new) details
may be distinctive, depending upon the phase of script development, strength of verbatim traces,
and/or ability to make source distinctions. These items may, therefore, enable children to retrieve
details from a specific occurrence while minimally intruding details from other occurrences.
In general, script theory is useful in predicting what children remember at the general
script level, but fails to account for the different source errors children make when asked to
speak about one specific occurrence. The schema-confirmation-deployment model (e.g., Farrar
& Goodman, 1992) accounts for why instantiations are absorbed into the script or not, but does
not describe whether or how those instantiations can be attributed to the correct occurrence. As
the new details were presented evenly across the four occurrences, and because one-third of the
older children, who performed adequately on this detail-type, nominated the third occurrence to
describe, primacy and recency effects do not easily explain our results. Rather, it seems that the
new details ‘stood out’. According to the schema confirmation-deployment model, new details
would be considered atypical to the script and thus episodically encoded leading to enhanced
memory for the item.
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Both fuzzy-trace theory and the source-monitoring framework make useful predictions as
to why children make source errors. The 4- to 5- year old children in this sample retrieved less
information and were less accurate about which session it occurred in than the 7- to 8- year old
children, giving support to fuzzy-trace theory’s assertion that younger children’s verbatim traces
decay more quickly. Our findings suggest that the verbatim traces of the older children for the
new items must have been stronger at retrieval than those of the younger children because half of
the older children reported these details while only three younger children did so. The prediction
that older children would more accurately attribute new items was supported by data from the
free recall phase, as the older children were above chance at retrieving the correct new item,
while the younger children were not.
Thus, it is possible that the 7- to 8-year old children were making some effective source
decisions at retrieval, but only with respect to the most distinctive details; the new details. Older
children (6- years and older) are better at monitoring sources than are younger children (4- year
olds) (Drummey & Newcombe, 2002; Roberts & Blades, 1999), and distinctive information
should be more accurately attributed than more routine details (Johnson et al., 1993). As such,
the source-monitoring framework predicted that there were would be fewer internal intrusions
about new items than other items. This effect was demonstrated in free recall for the 7- to 8- year
old children, suggesting that the new items made their corresponding source more distinctive
and, therefore, made it easier to distinguish the different occurrences. It could be suggested that
source information is encoded, as suggested by fuzzy-trace theory, but in the case where these
verbatim traces have decayed, source attributions can still be made at the retrieval stage, as
suggested by the source-monitoring framework. Thus, for children in this age range, distinctive
details may serve as effective labels for interviewers to use in eliciting information about a
specific occurrence, even when memory has decayed somewhat.
Although specific predictions were not made, there were a significant number of ‘don’t
know’ responses, accompanied by variability across age and item type. It was evident that 4- to
5- year old children were significantly more likely to use this response, suggesting that they
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failed to retrieve the verbatim detail altogether, due to its trace decay. Additionally, children
were more likely to realize that they did not know the answer when asked about a new or
variable instantiation, than when asked about a hi or lo instantiation. These findings complement
those reported by Roberts and Powell (2005) who reported that 5- to 6-year old children were
more confident in their answers about high frequency than low frequency instantiations.
Together, these studies are intriguing in that they suggest some metacognitive functioning about
variations in the difficulty of source decisions, despite the younger age.
Conclusions
One of the strengths of this research design is that we were able to ask the children about
the time they remembered best. Due to the number of variations present in each occurrence we
did not have to rely on the assumption that children would remember one specific deviation
episode provided by the interviewer, as previous research has done (Farrar & Boyer-Pennington,
1999; Farrar & Goodman, 1992; Powell et al., 1999; Powell & Thomson, 1996). This design also
more closely resembled the reality of everyday life; that is, even events that are routine often
include unpredictable variations as well as constants. Although the nature of events and their
details are not often known to field interviewers, understanding the conditions in which
children’s discrimination is heightened is useful for developing interview practices and
procedures.
The current research examined whether uniqueness helps children to distinguish between
a series of similar events. While the children rarely mentioned new details spontaneously, free
recall data demonstrate that when they are recalled by older children, their source accuracy is
above chance. In fact, they were accurate almost three-quarters of the time (73%). Accordingly,
we tentatively suggest that new details may be an avenue to assist older children with
discriminating between instances of a repeated event because interviewers can be more confident
that new items (compared to other item-types) have been accurately contextualized. These itemtypes may then serve as meaningful labels for separate instances, which were not constrained by
the interviewer (e.g., ‘the time there was a walrus’ versus ‘the time bird sounds were heard’).
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Anecdotal evidence from forensic transcripts of interviews about repeated-abuse allegations
suggests that children 7-years and older do spontaneously mention occurrences of abuse in which
something different from usual transpired (e.g., “I remember that time because I fell onto the
floor”). Future research incorporating a similar design could examine whether children who are
directly asked to talk about ‘unique’ aspects of one occurrence are better at distinguishing
between the similar occurrences than children who are simply asked to talk about the ‘time they
remembered best’.
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Footnotes
1

In some previous research (e.g., Powell & Thomson, 1997) variable items (i.e., those in

which the instantiation changes each time, such as leader’s cloak; yellow, green, red, blue) have
been referred to as “new” or “unique.” In the current study, new items refer to details that are
only present in one occurrence in any form (e.g., a walrus joined the group in occurrence 1 only,
and was never seen again).
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Appendix A
Example Target Items and Instantiations: Group 2

4

Item
Fox

Frequency
New

5
2

Noisy animal
Children sit on

New
New

19
6
12
1
13
3
7
9

Put objects away in
Warm-up activity
Music for relaxing
Children’s badge
Part of body to relax
Leader’s cloak
Story content
Bookmark

New
New
New
New
New
Variable
Variable
Variable

Yellow
Winter
Black triangles

11
16

Clown Puzzle
Container to hold
magnets
Counting objects
Source of story

Variable
Variable

Bike
Purse

Variable
Hi/Lo

Frogs
Library

Utensil to write
down name of story
Refresh activity

Hi/Lo

Pencil

Hi/Lo

Fans

Magnet picture
Objects hidden
under
Leader’s next stop

Hi/Lo
Hi/Lo
Hi/Lo

17
8
10
14
15
18
20

Occ 1
‘Pop’ the fox
joins activity
Walrus

Occ 2

Occ 3

Occ 4

Garbage
Bag
Lunchbox
Jump
Birds

Green
Party
Orange
circles
Juggling
Envelope

Red
Dog in city
Pink hearts
Tightrope
Box

Leaves
Stomach
Blue
Boat
Purple
squares
Car
Jar

Cars
Leader
wrote
Pencil

Flowers
Library

Tambourines
Library

Pencil

Pen

Airport
Blanket

Hand
sanitizer
Airport
Blanket

Hand
sanitizer
Construction
Blanket

Hand
sanitizer
Airport
T-shirt

Hospital

Movie

Hospital

Hospital
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Table 1
Means by Age and Detail-Type of Accurate Attributions in Free recall with Chance t-tests
4- to 5- Year Olds
Detail-Type

M

SD

n

(chance %)

7- to 8-Year Olds
M

SD

n

t-test

t-test

New (25%)

.00

.00

3

NA

.73

.47

11

t(10) = 3.39, p = .007

Variable (25%)

.23

.22

10

t(9) = .19, p = ns

.40

.36

20

t(19) = 1.79, p = ns

Hi (75%)

.91

.27

14

t(13) = 2.22, p = .045

.92

.15

20

t(19) = 5.11, p < .001

Lo (25%)

.00

.00

7

NA

.48

.45

17

t(16) = .96, p = ns
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Table 2
Mean Proportions of Accurate Attributions, Internal Intrusions and Don’t Know Responses to
Specific Questions as a Function of Detail Type
Accurate Attribution
Internal Intrusion
Significant Hi > new, variable & lo Variable, lo & new > hi
difference
New > lo
Variable > new
sa
Hi
.06 (.10)
.82 (.23) b
4-5 year
.72 (.28)
olds
7-8
.91 (.11)
New
.34 (.23)
4-5
.22 (.14)
7-8
.44 (.25)
Variable
.27 (.21)
4-5
.19 (.16)
7-8
.33 (.23)
Lo
.18 (.31)
4-5
.03 (.12)
7-8
.31 (..37)
a Significant t-tests evaluated at alpha < .008

Don’t Know
New & variable > hi

.07 (.11)

.08 (.20) c
.16 (.28)

.05 (.10)
.36 (.21)
.40 (.24)
.32 (.18)
.49 (.22)
.47 (.21)
.51 (.23)
.55 (.44)
.58 (.46)
.52 (.43)

.01 (.04)
.24 (.22)
.31 (.27)
.17 (.14)
.19 (.20)
.27 (.22)
.11 (.13)
.12 (.30)
.25 (.39)
.02 (.11)

b Standard deviations in parentheses
c Scores may be less than 1.00 because of coding for “other” responses.

